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The Canadian Forces currently in Afghanistan as part of a NATO coalition are playing a 
major role in a counter-insurgency campaign 
directed against a resurgent Taliban threat. 
Dealing with this menace will not be easy as 
the Taliban, realizing they cannot defeat NATO’s 
superior military strength, have resorted to 
asymmetric actions that strike at the coalition’s 
will through the cumulative effects of terror and 
small-scale “hit and run” military operations. 
Although NATO must contend with these 
tactics, concentrating solely on the military 
aspects of the problem will not address the 
real danger. 
 The true nature of the Taliban’s threat rests 
in its political strength and not in its military 
capability. In order to destroy the Taliban’s 
influence in the region a combination of 
political, social, economic, and military means 
are necessary. The complexities of dealing 
with these issues in a coherent manner are 
significant, but in the case of Afghanistan there 
is no precedent. Interestingly, the Soviets faced 
many of these same challenges while fighting 
a counter-insurgency campaign against the 
Mujahideen through much of the 1980s.1
 The Soviet experience should be of 
interest to coalition members as it provides 
a contemporary example of the challenges of 
conducting counter-insurgency operations 
within that country. Contrary to popular belief, 
the Soviets followed a logical and multifaceted, if 
somewhat brutal, counter-insurgency strategy 
in Afghanistan. A critical examination of the 
Soviet performance reveals that many of their 
failings can be directly attributed to a lack 
of resources and in this respect, there are a 
surprising number of similarities between the 
operational environment the Soviets faced and 
the situation that now confronts NATO. This 
paper will explore aspects of Soviet counter-
insurgency operations during their occupation 
of Afghanistan, and assess strengths and 
weaknesses relevant to current operations in 
that country.2
* * * * *
In the most basic terms, an insurgency can be viewed as an uprising against an established 
form of authority such as a government or 
occupying military force.3 Brad E. O’Neill 
defines an insurgency as a “struggle between a 
non ruling group and the ruling authorities in 
which the non-ruling group consciously uses 
political resources (eg. organizational expertise, 
propaganda and demonstrations) and violence 
to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of 
legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.”4 
In this context, insurgences are often used by 
the disaffected who recognize their inability to 
win against conventional military forces and, 
therefore, resort to actions that exploit popular 
grievances and attack the will and motivation 
of the status quo authority.5
 Conversely, counter-insurgency operations 
are carried out by the established authority and 
seek to destroy the insurgent, in part through 
political, social, and economic reforms to 
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alleviate the same grievances the insurgents are 
attempting to exploit. The established authority 
must carry out reforms while simultaneously 
attacking the physical entities of the insurgents’ 
military and political apparatus.6 Counter-
insurgency forces must be very cautious in 
their military actions, however, so as to limit 
collateral damage to the population. That is 
a very great challenge, as in many instances 
insurgents attempt to embed themselves within 
communities. Winning the “hearts and minds” 
of the populace, therefore, is critical for both 
the insurgents and the established authority. 
The cooperation of the population provides the 
basis for long-term operational sustainment 
and is a key enabler in developing the other 
conditions that are an essential precondition 
for the success of insurgency and counter-
insurgency alike. 
 In order for the established authority to win 
“hearts and minds” they must first be able to 
show they can protect the population and defeat 
the insurgents.7 As Lieutenant-Colonel John 
McCuen points out, “the most important part of 
a counter-insurgency is having the population 
organized for its own self-defence…Even in this 
early phase of the war, organization of local 
auxiliary police and militia units should be 
the first priority of the governing authorities.”8 
Establishing a secure environment within 
Afghanistan was a critical first step for the 
Soviet counter-insurgency effort, but it proved 
to be an extremely difficult challenge for them 
once they entered the country. 
 The genesis of Soviet involvement in 
Afghanistan was the seizure of control in 
Kabul by the People’s Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA), a Marxist organization, on 
27 April 1978. The new government announced 
a number of broad and ill-conceived reforms 
that alienated large segments of the population, 
and then did little to implement these reforms, 
which also alienated those who might have 
supported them.9 Rebellion broke out in 
the Nuristan region of eastern Afghanistan 
and in the following months spread widely. 
Increasingly, the PDPA relied on Soviet military 
assistance, and in October 1979 was forced 
formally to request Soviet intervention. 
 Although initially hesitant, the Soviets 
eventually acquiesced and in December 1979 
deployed the 40th Army, which consisted of 
three motorized rifle divisions, an airborne 
division, an assault brigade, two independent 
motorized rifle brigades and five separate 
motorized rifle regiments.10 The Soviets 
swiftly and efficiently took control of large 
population centres and secured key lines of 
communication,11 but pacification of the rural, 
warrior society proved far more difficult. Shortly 
after the invasion, Afghanistan erupted into a 
popular revolt against the occupying forces. 
The Soviets were confronted by a number of 
difficulties, including the formidable geography, 
a fragmented society that held no allegiance 
to a central authority, and a force structure 
that proved ill-suited for counter-insurgency.12 
The most significant problem, however, and 
one never rectified, was a lack of resources, 
specifically adequate numbers of “boots on the 
ground” to establish security.13 
 The Soviets deployed and maintained about 
100,000 troops in Afghanistan. According to 
American intelligence estimates, “An increase of 
perhaps 100,000 to 150,000 men might [have 
allowed] the Soviets to clear and hold major 
cities and large parts of the countryside or block 
infiltration from Pakistan and Iran, although it 
probably could not do both…. An even larger 
reinforcement of 200,000 to 400,000 men 
probably would [have allowed] Moscow to make 
serious inroads against the insurgency if the 
efforts could be sustained.”14 There have been 
a number of theories put forward as to why the 
Soviets did not provide sufficient manpower to 
A Soviet rifleman in Afghanistan.
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meet the needs of the Afghan theatre. According 
to declassified US military reports, the Soviets 
believed,“that the primary purpose of [their] 
intervention of December 1979 was to take 
over security responsibilities, so that [Afghani] 
government forces could concentrate on putting 
down the ever-growing insurgency.”15 Although, 
the Soviets may have initially expected the 
Afghan Army to carry the main burden of the 
fighting against the insurgents, the idea quickly 
proved unrealistic, at least in the short term. 
 Afghan soldiers were of extremely poor 
quality and in most cases unwilling to fight.16 
Morale in many of the units was so low and 
desertion to the Mujahideen so common that, by 
August 1980, the Soviets were forced to remove 
all anti-armour and anti-aircraft weapons from 
Afghan units for fear they would fall into the 
hands of the resistance. The incapacity of the 
Afghan Army forced the overstretched Soviets 
to assume additional duties. In so doing 
the Soviets became the center of gravity for 
success.17
 Unable readily to improve and expand the 
Afghan Army, the Soviets focused their efforts 
on securing their hold on cities and major 
towns.18 This was the most logical course, as 
the Soviets could not realistically regain the 
initiative until they had secured their own 
strategic bases. Unfortunately, they never had 
sufficient resources to move beyond the major 
cities as almost 85 per cent of the approximately 
100,000 troops in theatre were needed for these 
basic security tasks.19 
 The inability to expand control outside the 
major centres proved costly as more than 80 per 
cent of the country’s population lived 
in rural areas and these people were 
left vulnerable to the Mujahideen’s 
influence.20 In this respect, a key 
condition for success in the counter-
insurgency effort appears to have 
been forfeited from the beginning 
of the campaign. Interestingly, the 
failure of the Soviets to provide a 
permanent security infrastructure 
for the population did not deter 
them from attempting to persuade 
the people to stop supporting the insurgents. 
In fact, Soviet methods to win the “hearts and 
minds,” of the Afghans were quite sophisticated 
and varied considerably depending on the area 
they were targeting. 
 Shortly after the occupation the Soviets 
introduced a number of reforms that were 
designed to strengthen the relationship between 
religion and state. They gave the government 
in Kabul control of its own finances and this 
included the distribution of endowments to 
the country’s mosques. Religious leaders were 
granted exemption from military service and 
permitted a gratuity for visits to Mecca. These 
concessions quickly won over the Afghan 
mullahs who became an important source 
of support as they preached that Islam and 
Marxism sought a common goal and denounced 
the activities of the resistance fighters.21 
 Other “hearts and minds” initiatives 
included having the Afghan state press 
emphasize the government’s intention to 
respect and observe Islam as a “sacred 
religion.” In an attempt to showcase Afghan 
independence the Soviets allowed the use of 
the traditional Afghan flag, considered land 
reforms, attempted a rapprochement with its 
former enemies and released a large number 
of political prisoners.22
 The Soviets also took a number of steps 
towards creating a more homogeneous society 
within Afghanistan by slowly moving the country 
towards a Marxist philosophy. In this effort the 
regime in Kabul made extensive changes to the 
country’s education system. The curriculum 
was modified to emulate the Soviet model 
Helicopters were essential to provide the 
Soviets with mobility in a mountainous country 
which lacked basic intrastructure.
co
ur
te
sy
 o
f A
nd
re
w
 G
od
ef
ro
y
Balasevicius and Smith - Mujahideen.indd   75 06/11/2007   11:40:39 AM
3
Balasevicius and Smith: Fighting the Mujahideen
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2007
76
through the use of translated Soviet textbooks 
heavily laden with Marxist propaganda.23 
The government also rewrote official Afghan 
history to reflect a more harmonious historical 
relationship with the Soviet Union and replaced 
all other foreign languages in Afghan schools 
with Russian, which then became a pre-
requisite for advancement. Such techniques 
were referred to as the “Russification” of 
Afghanistan and sought, over the long-term, 
to achieve Afghan pacification.24
 Propaganda and psychological warfare 
became a key aspect of the Soviet’s “hearts and 
minds” campaign. In this respect the Russians 
attempted to legitimize the regime in Kabul, 
while undermining the insurgents’ belief in their 
cause by targeting specific groups with different 
massages. For example, efforts to win over the 
more educated urban populations focused 
on the benefits of the Soviet presence. Radio, 
television and print-media were used to portray 
the Russians as heroes and defenders of Afghan 
freedom and as historic friends to the Afghan 
people. These means were also employed to 
convince the urban populace of the security 
of the Kabul regime, and often highlighted the 
return of refugees from Pakistan to reinforce 
this message.25 
 In the Hindu Kush mountain range area 
of northern Afghanistan, the population 
is ethnically linked with the peoples of the 
Soviet Central Asian republics. The Soviets 
distributed films and even promoted love 
songs that highlighted these cultural ties, and 
showed how the southern Soviet republics 
had flourished under Communism.26 However, 
despite these efforts the Soviets were never able 
to gain significant support from the population 
or to appreciably delegitimize the cause of the 
insurgents. 
 This lack of success was due in large part 
to the fact that the Soviets could not make 
an impact in areas where they were unable to 
establish a permanent security presence. Over 
time, they found that any efforts to convince 
Afghans in rural areas, particularly in the 
south, of the legitimacy and benefits of their 
occupation proved to be useless and they 
eventually ended all programmes aimed at 
winning over the people in these areas.27 Instead, 
the Soviets were forced to try gaining control 
of the population by using what is commonly 
referred to as the stick technique.28 
 There are several ways of employing the 
stick technique, which can include minor 
punishments such as “curfews, collective fines, 
detention of suspects and various restrictions 
on individual liberties.…One powerful ‘stick’ 
in the battle for local support is the use of 
reprisals and harsh punitive measures applied 
A portion of a circa-1985 Soviet topographic map of the Kandahar region.
co
ur
te
sy
 o
f A
nd
re
w
 G
od
ef
ro
y
Balasevicius and Smith - Mujahideen.indd   76 06/11/2007   11:40:39 AM
4
Canadian Military History, Vol. 16 [2007], Iss. 4, Art. 8
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol16/iss4/8
77
in the hope of making the populace more 
frightened of the security forces then they 
are of the insurgents.”29 Over the course of 
the war such measures became a key part of 
Soviet strategy in areas where the Mujahideen 
had firmly established their authority. Unable 
to put sufficient forces into these areas, the 
Soviets ruthlessly attempted to separate the 
Mujahideen from the villages. Using Mao’s 
metaphor that guerrillas are supported by the 
population the way fish swimming in the sea 
are supported by the water, the Soviet approach 
in Afghanistan was to progressively empty the 
water out of the bowl, thereby killing the fish.30 
The Soviets used reprisal attacks and terror 
causing what has often been referred to as 
migratory genocide.31 
 This strategy was based on rapid retaliation 
against any rebel attack on Soviet troops with 
an overwhelming military response against 
villages in the immediate area of the assault.32 In 
certain rural areas where the rebel forces were 
strong, the Soviets deployed heavy mechanized 
forces with the simple goal of exterminating 
the local population.33 During these operations 
they destroyed the agricultural system upon 
which the rural population depended. Irrigation 
facilities, livestock, orchards, vineyards, water 
wells and crops were actively targeted with 
the express purpose of forcing civilians to 
choose between flight and starvation.34 After 
one such attack a Swedish official reported: 
“Russian soldiers shot at anything alive in six 
villages – people, hens, donkeys – and then they 
plundered what remained of value.”35
 The scope of this effort and the results 
were staggering. At the end of 1986, the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) estimated there were approximately 
3.2 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan with a 
further 50,000 scattered in Europe, India and 
the United States.36 Towards the end of the war, 
it was believed that there were upwards of 5 
million refugees in Pakistan and India, with a 
further 2 million rural Afghanis seeking refuge 
in Kabul and other Afghan population centres. 
In their efforts to eliminate potential bases of 
support, it is believed that the Soviets killed 
as much as nine percent of Afghanistan’s pre-
invasion population.37 
 Although extreme, the Soviet emphasis 
on eliminating bases and logistic support 
of the Mujahideen through relocation is not 
surprising.38 Insurgents need a secure place 
from which to operate and where they can rest, 
train, organize, draw supplies, and to provide a 
centre from which to control operations. In fact, 
the importance of bases and logistic support 
to the insurgents should make these assets a 
priority target for counter-insurgent forces.39 
As the Soviets were unable to secure control of 
many villages and thus eliminate their use by the 
Mujahideen through occupation, they adopted 
a policy of relocation through destruction. 
The main difficulty with this policy was that it 
backfired causing both international indignation 
and increased local and international support 
for the Mujahideen. 
 Significantly for the Soviets, these 
counterproductive actions did little to address 
the important problem of eliminating rebel bases. 
This is because the Mujahideen had established 
a number of secure bases or sanctuaries along 
both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border 
where they were able to regroup and continue 
operations.40 Understanding the significance of 
these safe havens the Soviets made concerted 
efforts to close the border area.41 Initially, they 
A portion of a circa-1985 Soviet topographic
map of the Kabul region.
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attempted to create government posts along 
the Afghan-Pakistani border from which they 
could launch attacks against Mujahideen 
columns. This proved unsuccessful due to the 
sheer length of the border, so the Soviets tried 
financially to co-opt border tribes to harass 
the Mujahideen bands.42 When these efforts 
failed, the Soviets started to carry out direct 
actions on both sides of the border. Although 
initially hesitant to violate Pakistani air space, 
by 1986 the Soviets had become so desperate 
they were striking all known rebel bases with 
air and artillery attacks. It is estimated that 
700 air and 150 artillery attacks were carried 
out inside Pakistan during the latter part of the 
war.43 
 In the end all measures to separate the 
Mujahideen from their sanctuaries failed. Even 
in 1986, which logistically was the worst year for 
the Afghan rebels, the Soviets only intercepted 
a third of supplies crossing the border.44 The 
failure to destroy the sanctuaries allowed the 
Mujahideen to continue to wear down the 
Russians’ strength with the cumulative effects 
of hit and run actions. To strike back at the 
elusive enemy, the Soviets launched large-scale 
military operations with their mobile reserves 
on suspected rebel positions.45 
 Employing techniques that the Western 
media often referred to as “Hammer and 
Anvil” operations, the Soviets would establish 
blocking positions and then conduct massive 
mechanized sweeps intended to crush any 
guerrillas that were caught between the two 
forces. These large-scale operations, using 
heavy mechanized forces, became a standard 
counter-insurgency tactic for the Soviets 
during the early part of the campaign. In the 
long term, these tactics proved futile largely 
because of the poor training of the soldiers in 
these units and the fact that the tactics were 
totally inappropriate for the conditions in 
Afghanistan.46 Over time, the Soviets realized 
the limitations of these actions and were able 
to adapt their organizations and operations 
accordingly. Moving away from their reliance 
on motor rifle units they started focusing on 
lighter, better trained, and more professional 
soldiers that included airborne, air assault, 
and special purpose (spetsnaz) forces. They also 
introduced new types of formations including 
mountain motor rifle battalions, and developed 
training and tactics that focused specifically on 
in-theatre operational requirements.47 
 Despite these reforms, which clearly 
increased operational efficiency, the Soviets 
were unable to achieve decisive results. These 
mobile reserves did not operate in conjunction 
with territorial units, police forces and local 
militias organized and coordinated to provide 
an essential security framework. As a result, 
the Mujahideen were able to maintain their 
mobility, and Soviet attacks often fell on empty 
countryside, as the Russians were rarely able 
to achieve tactical surprise or fix the enemy.48 
 The Mujahideen’s control of the population 
allowed them to develop an extensive network 
of observers and messengers throughout much 
of the country and this network maintained 
an almost continuous watch over Soviet 
movements.49 The Soviets, on the other hand, 
were forced to rely on technical intelligence 
provided by such means as aerial reconnaissance 
and radio interception, and these sources often 
failed to produce usable tactical information in 
a timely manner. Moreover, since the ground 
Top left: A Russian convoy defends itself against a 
Mujahideen ambush.
Bottom left: The Soviets achieved greater success in 
Afghanistan when they employed lighter, better trained 
and more professional forces, such as the Spetsnaz troops 
pictured here.
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forces were always short of combat elements, 
reconnaissance forces that could have provided 
the badly needed human intelligence capability 
that the Soviets lacked, were often tied down in 
close combat duties.50
 The Soviets did attempt to disrupt 
rebel actions and gain information through 
subversion, carried out by the Soviet intelligence 
services using Afghan spies and collaborators. 
Exploiting the fragmented nature of the 
population, the Soviets were able to persuade 
some villages to reach a truce and reject rebel 
demands for logistic support. Such villages 
were often found near major population centres 
and would form their own militia groups that 
protected the village and enforced law and order 
within the community. In certain cases, rebel 
groups were bribed into switching allegiances, 
while tribal chiefs were paid off with land and 
money to renounce support for the Mujahideen. 
These techniques of co-opting the population 
had the effect of creating “a stratum of people 
in the countryside that have a vested political 
and economic stake in the system and are likely 
to defend it.”51
 Subversion was particularly successful when 
used to spread conflict and division among the 
various resistance groups. Afghan society, and 
the rebel groups it produced, were inherently 
divded.52 The Soviets repeatedly attempted to 
exploit these divisions and turn the groups 
against each other. Agents were infiltrated into 
rebel organizations to attempt assassination 
of leaders, and spread disinformation in an 
effort to create conflict among bands or to 
discredit Mujahideen leaders. The fact that 
the rebels acted independently and did not 
possess modern means of communication 
to verify information or resolve differences 
made this technique all the more effective. 
One Mujahideen leader stated that “the KHAD 
(Democratic Republic of Afghanistan’s secret 
police) agents have rendered mujahed groups 
completely useless by getting them to fight 
among themselves.” He added, “Why should 
the Soviets worry about killing Afghans if the 
Mujahideen do it for them?”53 
 Despite this success, the Soviet policy of 
pitting the various Mujahideen bands against 
each other proved to be of limited value. 
Subversion tactics were often disrupted by the 
same weaknesses they were trying to exploit, 
the fragmented nature of the Afghan people. 
“At the root of the Soviet difficulties,” noted one 
military analyst, “military as well as political, 
lies the fact that Afghanistan is less a nation 
than an agglomeration of some 25,000 village-
states, each of which is largely self-governing 
and self-sufficient.”54 As one scholar put it, 
“Much has been written about the lack of unity 
within insurgent ranks, but little note has been 
taken of the extraordinary difficulties that such 
disunity poses to the counter-insurgent.”55 
 Overcoming the disunity of the country 
would have been a key step for the Soviets in 
winning the counter-insurgency campaign, but 
the reality on the ground was that they lacked 
the resources needed even to start the process. 
As General M.Y. Nawroz and Lieutenant-Colonel 
L.W. Grau lament in their article “The Soviet 
War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of 
Future War”: 
The Afghanistan War forced the 40th Army to 
change tactics, equipment, training, and force 
structure. However, despite these changes, 
the Soviet Army never had enough forces in 
Afghanistan to win. Initially, the Soviets had 
underestimated the strength of their enemy. 
Logistically, they were hard-pressed to maintain 
The Mujahideen enjoyed substantial international support 
in the form of funding and weapons. Sophisticated items 
such as Stinger ground-to-air missile took a heavy toll on 
Soviet forces.
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a larger force and, even if they could have tripled 
the size of their force, they probably would still 
have been unable to win.56
The direct result of the insufficiency of “boots 
on the ground” was the Soviets’ inability to 
establish a permanent presence in the rural 
areas where the majority of the population lived. 
This single factor prevented the achievement 
of the basic security conditions necessary 
for winning the “hearts and minds” of the 
people and without this support, defeat was 
inevitable. 
 This lesson is the most significant for NATO 
forces currently in theatre. In a conflict where 
“boots on the ground” are critical to setting 
the conditions for success, the coalition has 
only 40,000 soldiers currently deployed in the 
country.57 This compares to the 100,000 troops 
the Soviets deployed. To overcome the shortfall 
of troops NATO will need to train effective 
Afghan security forces in sufficient numbers 
to carry out the police and territorial defence 
tasks needed to establish security throughout 
the country, as well as providing some type 
of mobile capability. Doing so could shift the 
center of gravity for the conduct of operations 
from NATO to the Afghan government. However, 
without a significant increase in troop strength, 
NATO will not have the capacity to establish 
the conditions necessary to influence the 
population and if this cannot be achieved the 
coalition is unlikely to create the operational 
conditions needed for success in Afghanistan. 
 Another failure was the Soviets’ inability 
to cut off the Mujahideen from their supplies, 
especially along the border areas. This is the 
same problem currently plaguing NATO forces. 
The Soviets staged a well-organized 
withdrawal from Afghanistan in early 1989 
leaving behind a great stock of hardware.
Left and below: Guns lowered, hatches 
open, Soviet tanks wait for crews that will 
never return. The Tank Graveyard, a huge 
locked compound near Kandahar Airfield, is 
full of deactivated Soviet armoured fighting 
vehicles, artillery pieces and trucks, all 
parked in neat rows.
          (Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre
            IS2007-7466 & IS2007-7468)
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Unless the Taliban’s bases and sanctuaries are 
identified, attacked, and destroyed they will be 
able to continue fighting even with significantly 
reduced numbers. This in turn will allow them 
to continue striking at NATO forces, eventually 
wearing down the coalition’s resolve through 
the cumulative effects resulting from long 
term fighting. As a result, NATO and Afghan 
national forces must eliminate Taliban bases 
and sanctuaries, regardless of where they are 
located. Moreover, destroying a large portion of 
the Taliban’s infrastructure in one hard punch 
offers the best chance of hurting the Taliban 
sufficiently to buy the necessary time to get 
the Afghan national security forces trained, 
organized and in place for territorial defence 
missions. 
 Finally, the Soviets’ inability to fix the 
Mujahideen for decisive battle was due in part 
to the fact that the Soviets placed far too much 
emphasis on technical intelligence gathering. 
The important lesson that should be noted from 
this failure is that nothing can replace human 
intelligence in counter-insurgency operations. 
If NATO is to be successful in destroying the 
Taliban and other insurgents, they must first 
be able to find and fix the enemy and to do 
this they need to have excellent intelligence. To 
achieve this, a network of informers needs to be 
established throughout the country to report on 
insurgent movements, which must be a priority 
for the coalition’s intelligence capabilities. 
 Despite following a logical, multifaceted 
counterinsurgency strategy that clearly 
recognized the tenets for tactical and operational 
success, the Soviets were hampered throughout 
their campaign by a lack of resources. In the 
end, this prevented them from denying the 
insurgents any of their basic needs. Central to 
the failure was the Soviets’ inability to secure 
the country, allowing the rebels to operate 
freely by maintaining bases, mobility, supplies 
and information. In this respect, the Soviets 
were unable to influence what increasingly 
became a hostile population. Unable to sway 
the rural populations through persuasion, the 
Soviets turned to conventional military options 
in an effort to contain the growing resistance. 
When these methods did not work the Soviets 
started using terror, which eventually turned 
the population against them and removed 
any trace of legitimacy from their involvement 
in Afghanistan. Conversely, with the basic 
conditions for survival in place, the Mujahideen 
were, despite significant casualities, able to 
sustain a protracted conflict, eventually forcing 
the Soviets to withdraw. Can NATO learn from 
Soviet mistakes?
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